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Willingness to pay and willingness to work for improvements
of municipal and community-managed water services
squez1
William F. Va
1

Department of Economics, Fairﬁeld University, Fairﬁeld, Connecticut, USA

Abstract This study investigates household preferences, in labor time and monetary terms, for improved
water services in Guatemala using sequential contingent valuation questions. The household survey was
implemented in areas served by municipal and community-managed systems, which allows for comparing
household preferences under those governance approaches. Results show that respondents with municipal
services are willing to pay a substantial increase (more than 200%) in their water bills for reliable supplies of
safe drinking water. They are also willing to work approximately 19 h per month for such improved services
when labor hours are proposed as the payment vehicle. In contrast, households with community-managed
services are not willing to pay or work for service improvements, even though they report to be quite dissatisﬁed with current services. Policy implications are discussed.

1. Introduction
System improvements have become a priority to ensure continued provision of safe drinking water in many
developing countries. Unreliable systems providing water that is often unsafe to drink represent a latent
health risk. To mitigate that risk, many households expend a considerable amount of resources to treat tap
water at home [Pattanayak et al., 2005]. System unreliability also imposes considerable costs on households
that cope with frequent service interruptions by investing in in-home water storage [Pattanayak et al., 2005;
squez, 2012]. Those water practices may be less effective in mitigating health risks than expected given
Va
that some in-home storage devices facilitate recontamination of water after treating it [Rangel et al., 2003;
Wright et al., 2004]. Improving water systems is therefore necessary but system revenues seem to be insufﬁcient to operate and maintain water infrastructure and to adequately treat water for drinking purposes.
squez and Franceschi, 2013], lack of
As noted by a number of earlier studies [e.g., Grifﬁn and Mjelde, 2000; Va
information on local demand for improved services has been an impediment to the implementation of reliable, safe drinking supply systems in developing countries. Improved understanding of household preferences in the form of willingness to pay (WTP) for improved water services can inform pricing, affordability, and
equity policies to help achieve cost recovery in the context of water system improvements. In response to
the need of information on local demand for improved water services, contingent valuation (CV) studies
have proliferated in the last decade to elicit household willingness to pay for improved water services in
developing country contexts. Kobel and Del Mistro [2012] in Kampala (Uganda), Perez-Pineda and Quintasquez and Franceschi [2013] in Leo
n
nilla-Armijo [2013] in four semirural communities of El Salvador, and Va
(Nicaragua) provide recent examples of CV studies conducted in developing countries. Those studies provide evidence that households are willing to pay a signiﬁcant amount for improved water services. However, concerns persist that cost recovery from consumer demand is not feasible in many developing areas
[Abramson et al., 2011].
Abramson et al. [2011] argue that analyses of willingness to work (WTW) for improved services can also help
design appropriate policies for recovering operation and maintenance costs, particularly in rural areas
where WTP tends to be lower and costs of provision are systematically higher. Casiwan-Launio et al. [2011],
Lankia et al. [2014], and Rai and Scarborough [2012] present recent evidence suggesting that communities
are willing to contribute with their labor to the management of forest and marine resources. WTW estimates
can also be relevant for water systems, especially those systems that already depend on voluntary contributions of labor hours. Community-based water organizations (CBWOs), for instance, tend to rely on voluntary
labor contributions for system operation and infrastructure maintenance, as well as for administrative
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endeavors such as collecting water fees. Despite being a promising approach for cost recovery in areas
characterized by high poverty levels, household willingness to work for improved water services has
received little attention in the literature until now.
This article investigates household preferences for improved water services in the small town of San Lorenzo, Guatemala using a contingent valuation survey. In addition to eliciting household preferences in monetary terms (i.e., willingness to pay), this study investigates household willingness to work for uninterrupted
squez [2013a, 2013b] argues that the underlying structure of household
supplies of safe drinking water. Va
preferences for water services may vary depending on the type of service governance due to differentials in
squez and Franceschi, 2013]. Hence, the CV
service performance and institutional arrangements [also see Va
survey was implemented in areas served by the municipality and CBWOs in order to compare household
preferences under different governance approaches. Results indicate that household preferences are
indeed different between municipal and community-managed systems. Households with municipal services
are willing to pay a substantial increase in their water bills (more than 200% of the average water bill) for
reliable supplies of safe drinking water. Those households are also willing to work approximately 19 h per
month for improved services. In contrast, households with community-managed services are not willing to
pay or work for service improvements despite being quite dissatisﬁed with current services.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the institutional framework and current condition of municipal and community-managed water systems in Guatemala and describes the study site. Section 3 shows the survey design, including the CV scenarios implemented to elicit the willingness to pay and
work for improved water services. Section 4 introduces the analytical framework and econometric approach
used to analyze the CV data. Section 5 presents survey and estimation results. Section 6 concludes the
paper with a discussion of the results and some policy implications.

2. Drinking Water Services in Guatemala and Study Site
According to the Guatemalan constitution, as well as the municipal and health codes, municipalities are
responsible for providing safe drinking water to all residents in their territorial jurisdiction. These laws also
grant municipalities the right to transfer the management of water systems to private entities, which legitimizes the existence of CBWOs and private utilities in the country. The health code charges the Ministry of
Public Health and Social Assistance (MSPAS, for its initials in Spanish) with regulatory and supervisory
responsibilities to guarantee universal provision of safe drinking water in urban and rural areas. Water utilities, however, maintain total autonomy in setting water prices, operating water systems, and maintaining
water infrastructure. In addition, the Institute of Municipal Development (INFOM, for its initials in Spanish) is
mandated to support municipalities and CBWOs through investments in water infrastructure and development of technical and managerial capacities at the local level.
In practice, municipalities and CBWOs tend to be isolated with minimal governmental support because the
squez, 2011]. The existinstitutional framework is fragmented and ambiguous [see Ballestero et al., 2005; Va
ing legislation does not deﬁne clear relations among stakeholders (e.g., the central government, municipalities, nongovernmental organizations, and communities). Most community-managed systems are operated
according to internal regulations and local traditions [D’Andrea, 2012]. This is not surprising given that the
current legislation does not provide guidelines on how CBWOs should be formed or function, despite the
relevance and long existence of CBWOs particularly in rural areas.
In accord to their legal mandate, municipalities are the main supplier of drinking water in urban areas
squez, 2014]. In contrast, municipalities
reaching approximately 70% of urban households as of 2011 [Va
have failed to extend their water services to rural areas where only 15% of the households receive municipal water services. CBWOs have emerged, in an organic way, as primary providers of water in rural areas
serving about 40% of rural households. Both municipal and community-managed services are frequently
squez, 2014]. In addition, there are growing concerns regarding the quality of drinking water.
interrupted [Va
Several studies have reported that water sources are contaminated in urban and rural areas representing a
signiﬁcant health risk at the national level [e.g., Galindo and Molina, 2007; Instituto de Agricultura, Recursos
squez, 2013c]. In order to improve the quality of water services, MSPAS has
Naturales y Ambiente, 2005; Va
recently issued a number of ministerial agreements that regulate system operations, including treatment
methods. Those agreements also provide speciﬁc standards of water quality that all water utilities are
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expected to fulﬁl in 2014. Although well intentioned, these requirements will impose inherent costs on
municipalities and CBWOs that currently seem unable to raise enough revenues to provide reliable drinking
water services to their communities.
Water systems in our study site, San Lorenzo, provide an example of unreliable services that will require signiﬁcant improvements, if safe drinking water is to be provided. San Lorenzo is a small town with approximately 10,000 inhabitants, of which 90% live in rural areas. A total of 10 CBWOs provide water services in
the rural areas and the municipality serves the urban center to reach approximately 76% of San Lorenzo’s
inhabitants [Instituto Nacional de Estadıstica (INE), 2002]. Those water services, however, are frequently interrupted. The municipality and CBWOs also fail in implementing periodic water testing so there is no guarantee that piped water is safe to drink. Funding service improvements may be a challenge for the
n y
municipality of San Lorenzo and CBWOs given the prevalent poverty in the area. Secretarıa de Planiﬁcacio
n de la Presidencia and Instituto Nacional de Estadıstica [2006] estimate that 83.5% of San LorenProgramacio
zo’s inhabitants live below the national poverty line. Moreover, extreme poverty is estimated at 32.6% (The
national poverty lines are based on household consumption [see INE, 2006]. The extreme poverty line is
established at 3206 quetzals (U.S. $ 414), and the nonextreme poverty line is at 6574 quetzals (U.S. $ 848)).
The extreme poverty level in San Lorenzo is considerably higher than the national average of 13%. Poverty
indicators are consistent with emigration patterns in the area. The 2002 national census indicates that
12.6% of the households in San Lorenzo reported that at least one member of the household had emigrated in the 1990s [INE, 2002].
In this context of high poverty and population mobility, CBWOs may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to raise enough resources to improve water infrastructure and to operate and maintain improved systems given their dependency
on water fees and voluntary inputs provided by the community. CBWOs tend to be ineffective in collecting
the ﬂat rate they charge for their services. Payment enforcement mechanisms are limited to general
reminders to their constituents in periodical community meetings that they should pay their water bill. In
addition, CBWOs do not require households to provide labor inputs on a regular basis, so the responsibility
for operating the water system lies exclusively on a few CBWO members. The municipality also seems to
struggle in collecting revenues to improve the quality of its services, despite charging a volumetric tariff for
water services. In 2010, the town had revenues of 8.35 million quetzals (about $1.08 million U.S. dollars) of
which less than 11% was locally generated through taxes and service fees. This ranks San Lorenzo among
n Centhe municipalities with least capacity to generate local revenues in the state of San Marcos [Fundacio
troamericana De Desarrollo (FUNCEDE), 2011].
Municipalities and CBWOs can be expected to face difﬁculties in improving their water services in towns
with high levels of poverty such as San Lorenzo. Under these circumstances, it is necessary to investigate
the ﬁnancial feasibility and sustainability of service improvements. One step in this process is the analysis of
households’ willingness to pay for service improvements. Given that CBWOs partially depend on voluntary
contributions of labor, it is also appropriate to explore households’ willingness to work on managing, operating, and maintaining improved water systems. Information on household preferences for improved services may provide important inputs to the planning process of municipal and community-managed water
systems.

3. Survey Design
A household survey was carefully designed to gather information on household preferences for improved
water services. The survey design included one-on-one semistructured conversations and focus groups with
local residents implemented through different iterations in order to incorporate feedback. The questionnaire was pretested through a pilot survey implemented by trained interviewers (local residents) with a random sample of 30 households. The ﬁnal survey instrument was administered through in-person interviews
to a random sample of 500 households in June–August 2012. It is estimated that San Lorenzo has more
than 1500 housing units. However, municipal housing records are not updated, particularly for rural areas.
Therefore, a simple protocol was implemented to select 500 households. In order to identify the next house
to be interviewed, interviewers were instructed to generate a random number in the ﬁeld. Appointments
were arranged with sampled households that did not have time to respond the questionnaire in the ﬁrst
visit. Interviewers were instructed to replace a few households that could not be interviewed after a second
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visit. Out of the 500 households interviewed, 37.2% received water from the municipal system and the rest
was served by CBWOs.
The survey questionnaire was divided into four sections. The ﬁrst section collected information regarding
service performance and household practices. The second section asked respondents to report their satisfaction with different service characteristics (i.e., service hours, water pressure, water quality, and water
fees) using a four-tiered scale ranging from ‘‘very satisﬁed’’ to ‘‘very unsatisﬁed.’’ The third section included
the CV questions used to estimate households’ WTP and WTW for improved water services. The ﬁnal section
elicited respondents’ sociodemographic information and household characteristics.
Despite multiple criticisms, CV surveys have evolved to be one of the most viable methods of collecting
household preference data with regards to public goods and services [Carson, 2012; Carson et al., 2001;
Champ et al., 2003]. Choice experiments can also be used to investigate marginal values of service attributes
in labor-hour and monetary terms [e.g., Abramson et al., 2011; Rai and Scarborough, 2012]. However, choice
experiments demand signiﬁcant cognitive skills from respondents, which may complicate their application
in contexts of low education and lack of experience choosing among policy options, as our study site [see
Hanley et al., 2010]. Alternatively, sequential CV questions can yield stated preference data that is consistent
with choice experiments [see Christie and Azevedo, 2009]. There is also evidence that CV questions and
choice experiments yield similar WTP estimates [e.g., Loomis and Santiago, 2013]. Therefore, two sequential
contingent valuation questions were designed using a referendum format in order to elicit households’ willingness to pay and work for improved water services (i.e., uninterrupted supply of safe drinking water).
Respondents are familiar with referendum questions given that political elections have been implemented
in the town of San Lorenzo for more than three decades [FUNCEDE, 2011].
The CV scenarios were designed to value an improvement of current water systems in order to ensure continued supply of safe drinking water, in accord with the regulations that MSPAS has recently issued. The ﬁrst
referendum question begins with a description of current water services. Then, the CV scenario introduces a
project that will improve current water services in order to supply safe drinking water without service interruptions. Respondents are informed that they would have to pay an additional fee for the improved service
if the project is approved. The additional fee was randomly varied across respondents from 10 to 50 quetzals in increments of 10 quetzals. In addition, respondents are confronted with their budget constraint
through a reminder that the additional fee paid for improved services is money forgone in the consumption
of other goods. Finally, respondents are given the opportunity to vote for or against the project. The (translated) referendum-format CV question presented in the survey reads as follows:
For the following question, please keep in mind that current water supplies are frequently interrupted
and that piped water may be unsafe to drink. Suppose that the residents of your community will have
the opportunity to vote for or against a project that would improve the current water system. With this
new system, your house will have piped water 24 h a day, all days of the year. In addition, the water
would be puriﬁed to make it totally safe to drink. If the project is approved, your home would have to
pay an increase of [10/20/30/40/50] quetzals in your monthly water bill, in addition to your present payment. Please keep in mind that, if you decide to pay this amount in your monthly water bill, you will not
be able to use that money to buy food, clothes, and other things necessary to your home.
Would you Vote For or Against the project?
___ Yes (for the project) ___No (against the project)
In the follow-up CV question, respondents were confronted with a slightly different project in order to
investigate their willingness to work for improved services. The proposed project is similar in that it offers
uninterrupted service of totally safe drinking water. However, the payment vehicle is changed from a monetary fee to a (nonmonetary) contribution of labor hours to operate, maintain, and manage the improved
water system. Ahlheim et al. [2010] argue that labor should not be used as a payment vehicle in contingent
valuation studies because labor cannot be converted into utility as easily as money. However, in areas with
subsistence economies, housework may be the primary vehicle to obtain goods that increase households’
utility. Ahlheim et al. also indicate that empirical estimates of willingness to work depend on the kind of
labor to be done and the circumstances under which it has to be provided. Careful design of contingent
scenarios in which the tasks to be performed as part of the proposed program are clearly deﬁned can help
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overcome this limitation. Similarly to the willingness-to-pay question, the willingness-to-work question
reminded respondents that the labor hours allocated to operating and maintaining the water system would
not be available for paid work or other household activities. The translated referendum-format CV question
presented in the survey is as follows:
Suppose again that you have the opportunity to vote for or against a project that will provide you totally
safe drinking water 24 h a day, every day of the year. However, rather than paying an increase in your
water bill, an adult member of your household will have to work [4/8/12/16/20/24] hours per month in
managing, operating, and maintaining the water system. Keep in mind that this household member will
not be able to work or to do other household chores while working on the water project.
Would you Vote For or Against the project?
__ Yes (for the project) ___No (against the project)
The number of hours that a household member would have to work in exchange for improved services
were randomly varied across respondents from 4 to 24 h in increments of 4 h. The additional fee and the
number of labor hours presented in the CV questions were calibrated in the focus groups.

4. Analytical Framework and Econometric Modeling
The empirical analysis of household preferences for improved water services conducted here is based on a
utility-theoretic framework. The discussion of this framework is kept to a minimum given that similar theoretical models have been presented elsewhere. Eom and Larson [2006], for instance, developed a utilitytheoretic framework to analyze households’ willingness to pay and work for environmental quality improvements. In Eom and Larson’s model, households are assumed to derive utility from consumption of goods
and services, leisure, housework as needed for household maintenance, and a nonmarket good such as
drinking water. Households choose the levels of consumption, leisure, and housework in order to maximize
their utility subject to budget and time constraints. As a result, the (indirect) utility (V) can be expressed as a
function of the full prices of consumption goods (Pf), a full budget (Mf), and the quality of drinking water
services (W), as well as household characteristics (Z). The full prices of consumption and leisure include both
money prices and the market value of time for those activities. The full price of housework also includes the
money price and the time value for this activity. However, the value of housework time is lower than the
value of other time (i.e. time for leisure and consumption) because, even though housework has some marginal utility, the household would prefer to have to do less of it. The full budget includes the money budget
and the time constraints monetized at their shadow values.
The utility-theoretic framework predicts that households will be willing to pay or work for water service
improvements up to the extent that this payment does not decrease their utility below the original utility
level. Thus, a household’s maximum willingness to pay or willingness to work can be stated as follows:
VðMf ; Pf ; W0 ; ZÞ5VðMf 2WTP; Pf ; W1 ; ZÞ5VðMf 2wWTW; Pf ; W1 ; ZÞ

(1)

where W0 represents the current quality of water services, W1 represents improved water services under the
proposed project (i.e. uninterrupted supply of safe drinking water), and w is the value of saving housework
time. The underlying assumption in Eom and Larson’s [2006] model is that the household will take labor
hours from housework rather than from leisure time in order to pay for improved water services. This
implies that the number of hours that the household is willing to work for improved services should not be
valued at market wages, as the value of labor time is assumed to be higher than the value of housework
time.
In the empirical analysis, the willingness to pay and willingness to work for improved water services is
assumed to follow a log-linear speciﬁcation:
0

LNWTPi 5X i b1ui
0

LNWTWi 5X i d1vi

(2)
(3)

where LNWTP stands for the natural logarithm of household i’s willingness to pay for improved water services, LNWTW represents the natural logarithm of household i’s willingness to work for improved water
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services, X is a vector of covariates, b and d are conformable vectors of relevant coefﬁcients to be estimated,
and u and v are stochastic error terms. Since the error terms for the LNWTP and LNWTW functions are likely
to be correlated, u and v are assumed to follow a normal distribution with different scale parameters
(r2u and r2v , respectively) and correlation parameter quv [i.e., N(0, 0, r2u , r2v , quv)].
In the referendum format, households’ willingness to pay and willingness to work for the proposed improvement are not directly observed. It is expected that responses to the referendum question with the monetary
payment vehicle will be favorable (i.e., Rm 5 Yes) only if LNWTP is greater than or equal to the natural logarithm of the monetary fee (LNBIDm) presented to the respondent. Similarly, when the labor time is assumed to
be the payment vehicle, the respondent will vote for the proposed project (i.e., Rt 5 Yes) only if LNWTW is
greater than or equal to the natural logarithm of the labor time presented to the respondent (LNBIDt) in the
CV scenario. Otherwise, the respondent is expected to vote against the project. This implies that the probabilities of favorable responses to the CV questions are equivalent to the probabilities that willingness to pay and
willingness to work are greater than the corresponding bids proposed in those questions [i.e. P(Rm 5 Yes) 5
P(LNWTP > LNBIDm) and P(Rt 5 Yes) 5 P(LNWTW > LNBIDt)]. Therefore, the probabilities of favorable responses,
P(Rm 5 Yes) and P(Rt 5 Yes) are jointly estimated using bivariate probit models that allows the error terms u
and v to be correlated (see Greene [2012] for a thorough review of bivariate probit models.).
The bivariate probit models of WTP and WTW include the same covariates with the exception of the natural
logarithm of the monetary bid, which is included only in the WTP model, and the natural logarithm of the
labor hours that is included only in the WTW model. The likelihood of positive responses to the CV questions is expected to decrease with the bids presented to the respondent in the CV scenarios. The vector of
covariates (X) also includes indicators on system unreliability and water pressure. Households with more frequent service interruptions are expected to be more likely to vote in favor of the proposed project because
they can perceive a larger improvement in water services. Conversely, the likelihood of positive responses is
expected to decrease with higher levels of water pressure. Similarly, households that are more satisﬁed with
current services are expected to be less likely to vote for the proposed projects as they would perceive
smaller service improvements.
Additionally, household income and remittances are used as covariates to represent the full budget that
constrains household decisions in the theoretical model. As levels of income and remittances rise, some
constraints on household choices relax. Thus, richer households are expected to be more likely to vote in
favor of the proposed project. Household size is also used as a covariate, although no prior expectations are
held on the sign of its coefﬁcient. The likelihood of voting in favor of the proposed project can be expected
to increase with household size because a larger number of individuals will beneﬁt from the proposed project. However, from a theoretical perspective, the effect of household size can be negative because freely
disposable income decreases with the number of household members [see Ahlheim and Schneider, 2013].
Therefore, the effect of household size, as well as effects of other household and individual characteristics
included to control for household heterogeneity, remain to be empirically estimated.

5. Survey and Estimation Results
The subsamples of respondents with municipal and community-managed water systems show some similarities but also differences particularly in education and economic status. Table 1 shows that approximately
72% of the respondents were females, presumably because interviews were held during working hours
when males are more likely to be out of home. The average respondent in both samples is older than 40
years of age, lives in a household with almost six members, and has lived in their current home for about 20
years. Given that respondents have lived in their current housing unit for a long time, it can be expected
that they are quite familiar with the quality of water services in the study site. The average respondent with
municipal services has more than 8 years of schooling. In contrast, the average respondent with
community-managed services shows a lower level of education with about 3 years of schooling less than
respondents with municipal services. A similar pattern is observed in household income and remittances.
The municipal subsample of respondents earns almost six times more income than respondents with
community-managed services, and receives almost ﬁve times more remittances as well. A vast majority of
respondents own their homes, although there are more households renting their homes in the area covered
by municipal services than in the area with community-managed services (10.9 versus 3%, respectively).
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The municipal system outperforms the community-managed
Mean Comparison
systems in terms of service reliCommunity
Municipal
Tests
ability. Table 2 shows that servAge
40.288
42.470
t 5 1.499
ices provided by CBWOs are
(14.984)
(15.341)
Years of schooling
4.727
8.141
t 5 8.378***
interrupted more frequently than
(4.217)
(4.281)
municipal services. On average,
2
Female respondents (%)
72.7%
71.2%
v 5 0.126
community-managed services
(44.6%)
(45.4%)
Household size
5.792
5.554
t 5 1.042
are interrupted at least 3 h in
(2.427)
(2.290)
about 4 days in a week, with the
Years living in current housing unit
20.775
19.884
t 5 0.685
longest interruptions lasting
(13.495)
(13.541)
House owners (%)
97.0%
89.1%
v2 5 11.372***
almost an entire day. Municipal
(17.2%)
(31.2%)
services are interrupted approxiIncome per month (quetzals)
422.35
2,391.30
t 5 16.450***
mately 1 day per week, with the
(853.15)
(1,692.90)
Remittances per month (quetzals)
113.64
551.63
t 5 7.429***
longest interruptions lasting less
(361.98)
(883.91)
than 6 h. In addition to being
a
Notes: ***, **, * imply signiﬁcance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively; numbers in
more frequently interrupted,
parentheses are corresponding standard errors.
community-managed systems
also seem to provide water with
less pressure than the municipal system (see Table 2). Despite providing more unreliable services, CBWOs
charge higher water fees than the municipal system with an average difference of 7.37 quetzals per month
(almost 1 U.S. dollar). At ﬁrst glance, this differential in water bills may be surprising because CBWOs are
supposed to face lower costs than municipal systems given that water users provide voluntary inputs to
operate and maintain community-managed systems. However, the municipality may be able to provide
their services at a subsidized price because it receives ﬁnancial transfers from the central government.
CBWOs, on the other hand, receive minimal and sporadic governmental support to manage their systems,
if any.
Table 1. Sample Characteristicsa

Figure 1 shows the reported levels of satisfaction with service hours, water pressure, treatment, and price
from respondents with municipal and community-managed water services. Overall, respondents with
municipal services report higher levels of satisfaction than respondents served by CBWOs. Differentials in
satisfaction levels are all statistically signiﬁcant based on v2 tests reported in Figure 1. A vast majority of
respondents served by the municipal system are satisﬁed with water prices, treatment, pressure, and service
hours. In contrast, a majority of respondents with community-managed services are unsatisﬁed with water
prices, water pressure, and service hours. Water treatment is the only characteristic that satisﬁes a majority
of respondents with community-managed services, although that percentage remains below the percentage of respondents with municipal services that is satisﬁed with current water treatment (54.2 versus 64%,
respectively). Reported satisfaction levels suggest that current community-managed services are not
responsive to user preferences and that a latent desire for improved water services exists in the community.
On the other hand, households with municipal services are satisﬁed with current water services, although
some gains could be expected from improving current water treatment.
a

Table 2. Characteristics of Water Services

Days per week with service interruptions
Hours of longest service interruption
Hours of shortest service interruption
Monthly water bill (in quetzals)
Households reporting low pressure (%)

Community

Municipal

3.735
(1.607)
21.593
(7.009)
3.268
(0.402)
24.40
(11.982)
32.3%
(46.8%)

0.848
(1.402)
5.815
(9.713)
0.402
(1.928)
17.17
(6.105)
11.4%
(31.9%)

Mean Comparison
Tests
t 5 19.694***
t 5 19.949***
t 5 5.422***
t 5 7.532***
2

v 5 84.737***

a
Notes: ***, **, * imply signiﬁcance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively; numbers in parentheses are corresponding standard errors.


VASQUEZ

C 2014. American Geophysical Union. All Rights Reserved.
V

squez and TruFollowing Va
deau [2011], the internal consistency of reported levels of
satisfaction with daily service
hours, water pressure, treatment, and price was assessed
using factor analysis (see
Table 3). Estimated factor
loadings show a considerable
association between reported
levels of satisfaction with speciﬁc service characteristics
and a latent single scale,
namely overall satisfaction.
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Water treatment and price show the
lowest factor loadings (i.e., association
with the single satisfaction scale).
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistics
are above the critical level of 0.5 indicating that the degree of common variance among reported satisfaction with
daily service hours, water pressure,
treatment, and price is acceptable to
conduct a factor analysis [see Kaiser
and Rice, 1974]. Therefore, all four service characteristics are used to estimate
a standardized index of satisfaction
that is included as a covariate in WTP
and WTW probit models.
5.1. Preferences of Households With
Municipal Services
Households’ willingness to pay and
willingness to work for improved services are investigated through a number
of probit and bivariate probit models
of responses to the sequential referenFigure 1. Consumer satisfaction with current water services. Notes: positive percentages indicate satisfaction with water service attributes; negative percentages
dum CV questions presented above
indicate dissatisfaction. v2 tests indicate that satisfaction levels are statistically dif(see Gunatilake and Tachiiri [2012] and
ferent between the subsamples of households with municipal and communityVan Hecken et al. [2012] for recent
managed services: v2 5 121.88 for price, v2 5 8.69 for treatment, v2 5 81.86 for
pressure, and v2 5 122.32 for service hours.
applications of probit and bivariate
probit models used to investigate the
willingness to pay for improved water services.). A likelihood ratio test (v2 5 220.46) indicates that estimated
coefﬁcients for bivariate probit models are different across subsamples of households with municipal and
community-managed services. This suggests that household preference structures are different between
those service governance approaches. Hence, models of willingness to pay and willingness to work were
estimated for each subsample. Table 4 shows that the correlation estimate (q 5 0.518, p 5 0.001) is statistically signiﬁcant indicating that the models of willingness to pay and willingness to work are related to each
other through unobserved factors. Therefore, the bivariate probit model estimated here is suitable to analyze the preferences of households with municipal services.
As expected, estimation results indicate that respondents are sensitive to water prices and to the number of
hours that they would have to work in order to receive improved water services (see Table 4). In the WTP
model, the estimated coefﬁcient on the natural log of the bid is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. This
implies that the choice probability of voting for the project decreases with increases in the water bill proposed to fund the operation and maintenance of the improved system. Findings also indicate that households that receive services with better water pressure are less likely to vote in favor of system
improvements as indicated by the negative sign and statistical signiﬁcance of corresponding coefﬁcients.
Those households may perceive fewer beneﬁts from improving the system than households that receive
services with low water pressure and, therefore, are less likely to support the project.
Table 3. Factor Analysis of Consumer Satisfactiona

Service hours per day
Water pressure
Water treatment
Water price
Single Satisfaction Scale

Loadings

KMO

0.931
0.966
0.589
0.558
—

0.578
0.577
0.639
0.909
0.6245

a
Notes: the eigenvalue for the ﬁrst factor is 2.458.
For other factors, Eigen values are less than one.
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Respondent’s age is the only personal characteristic that
seems to be associated with the WTP for improved services. The choice probability of voting for the project
squez and
decreases with the age of the respondent. Va
Franceschi [2013] also found a negative relationship
between age and WTP for improved water services in
Nicaragua. They argue that older individuals may be used
to low service quality and that they may downplay their
expectations for water service improvements as a result of
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Table 4. Biprobit Models of Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Work for Improved Municipal Water Services (Marginal Effects)a
Variables
Natural logarithm of the bid
Natural logarithm of the labor hours
Days per week with service interruptions
Regular water pressure (15Yes; 05Otherwise) (base 5 low pressure)
High water pressure (15Yes; 05Otherwise) (base 5 low pressure)
Monthly household income (in 1000’s quetzals)
Monthly remittances (in 1000’s quetzals)
Standardized index of satisfaction
Years living in current housing unit
Household size
If the household owns the housing unit (15Yes; 05Otherwise)
If the respondent is female (15Yes; 05Otherwise)
Respondent’s age
Respondent’s education
Observations
Rho

WTP

WTW

Variable Mean

20.494 (0.075)***
—
20.071 (0.051)
20.265 (0.159)*
20.312 (0.138)**
0.009 (0.024)
0.025 (0.034)
20.019 (0.084)
20.0003 (0.003)
0.028 (0.017)
20.010 (0.121)
0.054 (0.086)
20.009 (0.004)**
20.008 (0.013)

—
20.259 (0.071)***
20.033 (0.060)
20.087 (0.162)
20.040 (0.186)
20.015 (0.030)
0.020 (0.038)
20.168 (0.106)
0.004 (0.004)
0.051 (0.021)**
20.131 (0.149)
0.136 (0.095)
20.015 (0.005)***
20.027 (0.017)

3.227
2.465
0.859
0.333
0.554
2.853
0.763
0.545
20.257
5.604
0.898
0.717
42.508
8.107

177
0.518***

a
Notes: ***, **, * imply signiﬁcance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively; numbers in parentheses are corresponding standard errors.
Marginal effects are computed at the mean values of independent variables.

their longer exposure to unreliable services. It could also be that, compared to younger respondents, older
individuals may expect a shorter future lifespan to enjoy the beneﬁts from an improved water system. Thus,
the lower levels of support to the proposed project found among older respondents may reﬂect lower discounted beneﬁts relative to younger individuals. Other factors are found to be statistically insigniﬁcant suggesting that they have little inﬂuence in the decision to support the proposed project. The insigniﬁcance of
household income is particularly unexpected because economic theory suggests that income constraints
play an important role in households’ decision for paying for improved water services. It can be argued,
however, that the bids presented in the initial contingent scenario (10–50 quetzals per month) are low relative to household income (2391 quetzals per month, on average). That is, income is not a binding constraint
for improving municipal water services.
The median WTP can be computed from the same probit coefﬁcients that were used to derive the marginal
effects reported in Table 4. The median WTP is estimated as exp(-XNONBID* bNONBID/bLNBID) where XNONBID is
the vector of averages of variables used to estimate the bivariate probit model (see Table 4) with the exception of the natural logarithm of the bid. bLNBID represents the estimated coefﬁcient of the natural logarithm
of the bid and bNONBID represents the vector of estimated coefﬁcients of corresponding covariates other
than the bid. Also, 95% conﬁdence intervals of the median WTP are estimated using the delta method,
which is suitable to compute the variance of nonlinear combinations of estimated coefﬁcients [see Hole,
2007 for a detailed description of the delta method].
The estimated median willingness to pay is 36.20 quetzals (about 4.65 U.S. dollars), with a 95% conﬁdence
interval of 26.93–45.47 quetzals. This implies an increase in the average monthly water bill of more than
200%, equivalent to 1.5% of the average household income. If the municipality increases the average water
bill by 36.20 quetzals (up to 53.37 quetzals), the total household expenditure on tap water would be 2.2%
of the average household income, which is below the internationally-accepted affordability threshold for
water services of 3% of household income [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), 2003]. The WTP for improved municipal water services in San Lorenzo is also below WTP estimates
squez and Franceschi [2013], for instance, found that the median household in
from neighbor countries. Va
n, Nicaragua is willing to pay over 8% of its income for reliable drinking water services. Va
squez et al.
Leo
[2009] report a WTP estimate of almost 6% of the average household income in Parral, Mexico.
Respondents served by municipal services are also responsive to the number of hours that households
would have to work in order to receive improved water services (see the WTW model in Table 4). As
expected, the corresponding coefﬁcient is negative and signiﬁcant suggesting that the choice probability of
voting for the project decreases with the number of hours that they would have to work in exchange for
improved services. Larger households seem to lend more support to the proposed project than smaller
households. Households with more members have a larger number of labor hours available that can be
used to pay for the proposed improvement in water services. In addition, the estimated coefﬁcient on
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Table 5. Probit Models of Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Work for Improved Communal Water Services (Marginal Effects)a
Variables
Natural logarithm of the bid
Natural logarithm of the labor hours
Days per week with service interruptions
Regular water pressure (15Yes; 05Otherwise) (base 5 low pressure)
High water pressure (15Yes; 05Otherwise) (base 5 low pressure)
Monthly household income (in 1000’s quetzals)
Monthly remittances (in 1000’s quetzals)
Standardized index of satisfaction
Years living in current housing unit
Household size
If the household owns the housing unit (15Yes; 05Otherwise)
If the respondent is female (15Yes; 05Otherwise)
Respondent’s age
Respondent’s education
Observations
Pseudo R2

WTP

WTW

Variable Mean

20.159 (0.055)***
—
0.035 (0.020)*
20.086 (0.066)
20.011 (0.087)
0.096 (0.040)**
0.082 (0.079)
20.067 (0.031)**
20.002 (0.003)
0.015 (0.011)
0.029 (0.153)
0.058 (0.074)
0.003 (0.003)
0.028 (0.009)***
260
0.187

–
20.013 (0.053)
20.074 (0.023)
20.055 (0.071)
20.064 (0.101)
0.049 (0.033)
0.247 (0.101)**
20.072 (0.034)**
0.001 (0.003)
0.009 (0.013)**
0.008 (0.175)
0.008 (0.073)
0.002 (0.003)
0.005 (0.010)
260
0.1563

3.228
2.465
3.750
0.531
0.146
0.573
0.177
20.426
20.754
5.781
0.969
0.731
40.392
4.709

a
Notes: ***, **, * imply signiﬁcance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively; numbers in parentheses are corresponding standard errors.
Marginal effects are computed at the mean values of independent variables.

respondents’ age is negative and signiﬁcant, similarly to the WTP model. Other factors are found to be statistically insigniﬁcant.
The WTW model is also used to estimate the households’ willingness to work for improved water services.
The median WTW is estimated at 18.9 h per month, with a 95% conﬁdence interval of 7.2–30.5 h per month.
The hourly wage for unskilled labor in the municipality is about 10 quetzals. If a similar wage were to be
paid for working in system operation and maintenance, the WTW estimate would be equivalent to 189
quetzals per month or more than 500% of the estimated WTP. Abramson et al. [2011] also found that households are willing to work for improved access to water in rural Zambia, and that the monetary value of their
WTW surpasses their WTP when time is valued at market wages. However, they argue that households
would reallocate housework time to work for improved services (rather than leisure time) and that the value
that households assign to housework time is lower than wages paid in labor markets. Under the assumption
that households would reallocate housework time to work for improved water services, a comparison of our
WTP and WTW estimates (36.20 quetzals and 18.9 h, respectively) suggests that housework time is valued at
approximately 2 quetzals per hour, which is equivalent to 20% of market wages.

5.2. Preferences of Households With Community-Managed Services
Bivariate probit models were also estimated to investigate the preferences of households with communitymanaged systems. Nevertheless, the correlation estimate was found to be statistically insigniﬁcant
(q 5 20.081, p 5 0.5). Hence, Table 5 shows separate probit models of willingness to pay and willingness to
work for the subsample of households with community-managed services as there is no gain in allowing
the error terms to be correlated. Results from the WTP probit model suggest that respondents are responsive to the bid presented in the contingent scenario, lending less support to the proposed project when
water bills are increased by a larger amount. On the other hand, households experiencing frequent service
interruptions are more likely to vote in favor of the project than households with fewer interruptions, most
probably because they perceive more beneﬁts from the proposed project. More afﬂuent households are
also more likely to vote in favor of the project. This income effect was found to be statistically insigniﬁcant
for the subsample of households with municipal services arguably because they have higher income levels
relative to their willingness to pay and thus income is not binding their decision to support the project. On
the other hand, households with community-managed services may be constrained due to the low levels of
their household income.
Additionally, the satisfaction index is found to be negative and statistically signiﬁcant (at 5% level) indicating that respondents who are unsatisﬁed with current water services are more likely to vote in favor of system improvements. The estimated coefﬁcient on respondents’ education suggests that the choice
probability of voting for the project increases with years of schooling. Awareness of the beneﬁts derived
from improving water services can increase with education, which may explain why respondent with higher
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levels of education are willing to pay more
for service improvements [Arouna and Dabbert, 2012]. Other factors do not seem to
impact the respondents’ willingness to pay
for improved services.
The preference structure of households
with community-managed services is different when the payment method is labor
hours instead of monetary fees (see Table
5). Contrary to expectations and to the
results from the subsample of households
with municipal services, the amount of
Figure 2. Survey quality indicators.
work hours is not a determinant of the decision to support the proposed project. In
contrast, remittances, satisfaction with current services, and household size affect the choice probability of
voting in favor of the proposed project. The likelihood of supporting the project increases with remittances
presumably because remittances can relax some constraints allowing the recipient household to allocate
more labor hours to operation and maintenance of the improved system. Similar to the project with a monetary payment vehicle, satisfaction levels have a negative effect on the choice probability of voting for the
project that would require them to work in exchange of improved services. In addition, the likelihood of
voting for the project increases with number of household members, an effect that is consistent across subsamples of households served by the municipality and CBWOs.
The probit models presented in Table 5 are used to estimate the median willingness to pay and the median
willingness to work for improved services. Those estimates are found to be statistically insigniﬁcant suggesting that households with community-managed services are not willing to pay or work for the proposed
improvements. For community-managed services, the median WTP is estimated at 181.29 quetzals, with a
95% conﬁdence interval of 289.87 to 452.39 quetzals. The median WTW cannot be computed because the
coefﬁcient of the (log) labor hours is statistically equal to zero. This is somewhat unexpected given that a
majority of respondents with community-managed services demonstrate to be dissatisﬁed with those services. The lack of willingness to pay or work for improved services may be an obstacle for CBWOs that intend
to improve their water services.
The survey included some questions to assess the credibility of the contingent scenarios used in this study.
A vast majority of respondents believe that it is feasible to implement the proposed project, particularly in
those areas served by CBWOs (see Figure 2). In addition, more than 90% of respondents believe that survey
results may have policy consequences on the quality of water services. These results suggest that respondents found the contingent scenarios to be credible, thus lending further support to the validity of WTP and
WTW estimates presented above.
Models presented in Tables 4 and 5 were estimated excluding the satisfaction index to investigate potential
multicollinearity issues in estimated coefﬁcients, particularly due to potential correlation between the standardized index of satisfaction and water service characteristics (service interruptions and water pressure).
Results are robust in terms of sign and signiﬁcance of estimated coefﬁcients. Variance inﬂation factors (computed for all covariates in Tables 4 and 5) are within an acceptable range of 1.01–2.35, with an average of
1.60. This provides further evidence that estimation results presented in Tables 4 and 5 are robust.

6. Discussion and Policy Implications
This study investigated household preferences, in labor time and monetary terms, for improved water services in the small town of San Lorenzo, Guatemala. The analysis was conducted in areas served by the municipality and CBWOs to compare household preferences under those governance approaches. Findings
indicate that respondents with municipal services are willing to pay a substantial increase in their water bills
(more than 200% of the average water bill) for a reliable supply of safe drinking water. They are also willing
to work approximately 19 h per month for improved services when labor hours are proposed as payment
vehicle. Conversely, respondents with community-managed services are not willing to pay or work for
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service improvements, even though they report to be quite dissatisﬁed with current services. These ﬁndings
are consistent with previous studies that indicate that households value municipal water services, but do
squez, 2013a, 2013b].
not value community-managed services in Guatemala [Va
It could be argued that households served by CBWOs are used to low-quality services and, consequently,
they are not willing to pay or work for improved services. However, those households report low levels of
satisfaction with different attributes of the water supplied, and satisfaction was found to be negatively
related to the likelihood of voting in favor of the proposed projects. This lends little support to the hypothesis that they do not consider service improvements to be needed in their communities. Moreover, a vast
majority of households served by CBWOs believe that it is feasible to implement the proposed project in
their community, and that survey results may be consequential for policy purposes. These results rule out
the possibility that households with community-managed systems show a low willingness to pay or work
because they are skeptical about the project presented in contingent scenarios.
A more plausible explanation could be that the lack of willingness to pay for improved services is a reﬂection of households’ inability to pay given that household income is a determinant of the likelihood of voting
in favor of the proposed project. On average, households with community-managed services already pay
approximately 5.8% of their household income (4.6% if remittances are included), which is above the
internationally-accepted affordability threshold of 3% [OECD, 2003]. Moreover, households served by
CBWOs may be aware that they already pay higher water bills for services that are interrupted more frequently in comparison to their neighbors with municipal services. This may create distorted perceptions
among households with community-managed services, that current water fees are already high enough to
recover operation and maintenance costs, and perhaps to ﬁnance service improvements. As a result, those
households are not willing to pay an increase in their water bills for improved water services.
A potential limitation of this study is that protesters and yea-sayers were not identiﬁed in the survey instrument, although focus groups participants seemed to base their voting decisions on budget constraints. Protesters can introduce a downward bias into WTP and WTW estimates because they reject the proposed
project even though they would be willing to pay for service improvements. It is worth noting that, in the
context of this study, particularly in community-managed systems, protesters can actually decide not to pay
any increase in water bills given that CBWOs lack mechanisms to enforce water bill payments. Under those
circumstances, the inclusion of protesters would yield a lower bound estimate of willingness to pay that is
arguably more consistent with increases in water bills that water utilities could actually collect for service
improvements. Respondents could also vote in favor of the project even if they are not willing to pay for
improved services (i.e. yea-saying). The presence of those respondents may lead to overestimating households’ willingness to pay for improved services. WTP estimates presented in this study are lower than estisquez et al., 2009; Va
squez and
mates presented by previous studies conducted in similar contexts [e.g., Va
Franceschi, 2013] and the internationally-accepted affordability threshold for water services of 3% of household income. This suggests that, even if our estimates are upwardly biased due to yea-sayers, that bias is
not a substantial one.
The willingness to pay and work of households with municipal services indicate that there is a latent
demand for improvements in system reliability and water quality. WTP estimates can be used in the design
of public investment criteria, and to inform pricing, affordability and equity policies to help achieve cost
recovery. In addition, estimates of willingness to work reveal the potential to implement a voluntary work
program to pay for improved water services. Such a program could provide an alternative to households
with excess of labor supply that deem system improvements to be necessary but cannot afford increases in
their water bills. If the program is implemented, the municipality would observe a reduction in their costs
from having a voluntary labor force to operate and maintain the water system. As Abramson et al. [2011]
argue, cost recovery through willingness to work seems to be a promising alternative for setting sustainable
water projects in poor areas such as our study site. On the other hand, the unwillingness to pay or work
that was found among households with community-managed services represents a potential obstacle for
CBWOs that plan to improve water services. Ofﬁcial assistance to invest in water systems would be required
squez, 2014]. CBWOs would also beneﬁt from the
to improve the quality of water services in rural areas [Va
institutional support of government agencies such as INFOM and MSPAS to improve their operational and
managerial skills, in order to increase community participation and system revenues. This issue deserves
more attention in future studies.
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